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1  Introduction 
Over their 1980s business cycles the United States and Great Britain experienced large 
increases in income inequality (both before- and after-taxes) while the middle of their 
distributions decreased. (Duncan, Smeeding, and Rodgers, 1994; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1997)  However, Burkhauser, Cutts, Daly, and Jenkins (1999) using before-tax income data show 
that while the mass in both tails of their distributions increased significantly, by far the greatest 
gains were in the upper tail.  So, income inequality increased primarily because the middle of 
their distributions got richer at different rates, rather than because a large part of the middle of 
their distributions became poorer.  In this paper we update, expand and improve the methods 
used by Burkhauser, Cutts, Daly, and Jenkins (1999) to look at how the United States and Great 
Britain as well as Germany and Japan fared over the 1990s business cycle. 
  In contrast to the United States and Great Britain, before-tax income inequality grew only 
slightly and after-tax (disposable) income not at all in Japan and Germany over their 1980s 
business cycle. (Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997).  
Hence by the beginning of the 1990s business cycle, the United States had the highest level of 
income inequality, followed by Great Britain, Japan and Germany. 
However both the before- and after-tax income distributions in Japan have increased 
substantially since then. (Smeeding, 1997; Fukawa, 2002; Terasaki, 2002 and Tachibanaki, 
2005).  By the middle of the 1990s, Smeeding (1997) using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
data reported that Japanese after-tax income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, while 
still substantially below the United States, was at or above the income inequality level of 
European countries.    
  3
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), Biewen (2000) found that 
in the first few years following reunification, in 1989, after-tax income inequality in reunited 
Germany also increased. Forster and Pearson (2002) report similar results over a slightly longer 
period using LIS data. Most recently Bach, Corneo, and Steiner (2007) find even greater 
increases in income inequality over the period 1992-2001 using GSOEP data together with 
German tax record data to capture the upper tail of the German income distribution.  
What is not known is how the shape of the income distribution in all four of these 
countries changed over their 1990s business cycles. Since we are interested in making cross-
national comparisons, and because taxes play a much larger role in the other three countries than 
in the United States, in this paper we focus on after-tax (disposable) income and measure 
household income net of income and social security taxes in all countries.  
2  Data 
For the United States, we use data from the March Current Population Survey’s Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement (CPS), for Germany and Great Britain we use data from the 
Cross-National Equivalent Files (CNEF) prepared at Cornell University (Burkhauser, Butrica, 
Daly and Lillard, 2001), and for Japan, we use data from the Survey on Income Redistribution 
(SIR) to compare longer term trends in average after-tax income and after-tax income inequality.   
We separate the cyclical factors that influence yearly fluctuations from longer secular changes by 
comparing peak years of the 1990s business cycle in each country.  Since each country’s business 






The CPS, on which most studies of United States income inequality are based, does not 
directly question its respondents about their federal income or social security tax payments.  
Because most cross-national comparative studies of income inequality are based on disposable 
income, LIS simulates these tax values for the CPS data and makes them available to the research 
community. However LIS does not provide these values for all CPS years. Furthermore, because 
confidentiality rules prevent researchers from gaining access to most of the core country data sets 
in LIS, researchers can not independently verify these tax simulations and must accept all LIS 
harmonization procedures in order to use these data for cross-national comparisons.  
For these reasons, we use the National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model to 
approximate income and social security taxes with our consistently top-coded CPS income 
variables for the years 1979 through 2000.  With this information we are able to calculate the 
household size-adjusted after-tax (disposable) income of individuals living in United States 
households.  While we use data for all years from 1979 to 2000, we focus our comparisons on 
peak business cycle years 1979, 1989, and 2000.  
  We use CNEF for our calculations of Great Britain and Germany. While we use data for 
all years of their business cycles, we focus our comparisons on peak years 1990 and 2000 for 
Great Britain and peak years 1991 and 2001 for Germany. A major advantage of the CNEF data 
is that it provides harmonized measures of household income before and after the impact of the 
government tax-and-transfer systems in Germany and Great Britain, based on the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  These are both 
representative household panels of their countries. CNEF, unlike LIS, is able to provide 
researchers access to its original country data sets and to all its harmonization programs so that 
individual researchers can either accept these harmonization decisions or customized them for 
their own purposes.  
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  The CNEF data include standard demographic information as well as information on 
household income and its components and individual data on employment and labor earnings. 
Also included are cross-sectional and longitudinal sample weights, and macroeconomic 
indicators for each country. Households from the eastern states of Germany were included in the 
German data beginning with income year 1989.  We use the CPS data here rather than the CNEF 
equivalized values from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics since we want to compare our 
results to Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville and Rovba (2004) and more importantly because the 
CPS provides much greater sample sizes.   
We use SIR data for our calculation of Japan which is fielded by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare of Japan. Every third year SIR collects information on household income and its 
sources such as social security income, medical care, and family allowances, and the Ministry 
estimates tax payments for its households.  We compare peak years 1989 and 2001. 
Since most measures of income inequality are sensitive to outliers, we exclude 
observations in the top and bottom two percent of the household size-adjusted after-tax income 
distribution in Germany, Great Britain, and Japan. For the United States we use the consistent top 
coding convention discussed in Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville and Rovba (2004) to control for 
outliers. 
As Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville and Rovba (2004) show, top coding in the 
uncorrected public use CPS data will dramatically distort trends in income inequality in the 
United States especially before and after 1995. Consistently top coding the data allows the 
researcher to consistently capture income inequality in approximately the bottom 97 percent of  
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the income distribution. However this method will also systematically miss the top part of the 
income distribution.
2  
3  Measuring Economic Well-Being  
All income calculations are based on household after-tax (disposable) income. That is, 
income from all sources (labor earnings, income from investments and savings, public and 
private pensions, and transfers) minus total household income and social security taxes. Our 
measure of after-tax income does not include non-money transfers such as food stamps or the 
rental value of one’s home.  
To control for differences in the number of people living in a household and hence the 
share of household income each person controls, it is important to take into consideration 
economies of scale associated with joint residence.  How much income sharing occurs among 
household members is a matter of some debate, as is the economies of scale associated with 
shared living within a household.  We assume household income is equally shared and a scale 
elasticity of 0.5.  Burkhauser, Smeeding and Merz (1996) note that these are common 
assumptions used in the cross-national literature.
3  
Sharing Unit.  The CPS family definition, based on marriage or blood relationship, is 
often used as the income-sharing unit in the United States income distribution literature, but the 
CPS household definition, based on common residence, is closer to what is used in most cross-
national studies. It is the one we use here for the United States. The BHPS and GSOEP sharing-
unit definitions fall somewhere between the CPS family and common residence definitions in 
that they include unmarried non-blood-related cohabitants in the "family" but exclude other 





"household" to describe the British and German sharing units in our analysis, although they only 
approximate the CPS household definition. In the SIR for Japan, household is defined in a 
manner similar to the CPS—as all persons sharing the same housing unit, regardless of any 
familial relationship. 
Adjusting for inflation. While summary measures of the income distribution used here 
(90/10 ratio and Gini coefficients) are insensitive to the fluctuations in the units of the currency, 
as is the shape of the income distribution, comparisons of real changes in average income and in 
the movement of the income distribution over time are sensitive to these fluctuations.  Here we 
use the Consumer Price Index-X (CPI-X) to adjust for inflation in the United States because it is 
the official measure of inflation used by the United States Bureau of the Census.  
We use the International Monetary Fund Consumer Price Index for Germany, Great 
Britain and Japan. All incomes are converted to 2000 monetary units.  
Defining the Older Population. Our age dichotomy is somewhat arbitrary. We divide our 
total sample into persons aged 65 and over and persons younger than age 65.   
Estimating Income and Social Security Taxes for Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Households. The CPS does not question its respondents about their federal income or social 
security tax payments. Rather, Unicon Group at RAND simulates these payments. However, the 
RAND simulations of tax payments do not adjust reported income for changes in top coding. The 
CPS top codes all sources of income (e.g. wages and salaries, interest, etc.).  Since the nominal 
income of the population rises each year, the share of the income distribution that is affected by 
top coding will change. This is also the case when the Census Bureau periodically changes the 
nominal value of the top codes.  As a result, taxes simulated by RAND are not adjusted for 
differences in top coding over time. To address this issue, we impose consistent top coding 
solutions on each source of income, and sum over each of these sources to generate our measure  
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of an individual’s income in a given year. We do this by top coding income at the same percentile 
of the income distribution from that source for all years.  That is, we determine in which year the 
largest portion (lowest percentile) of the income distribution from that source was affected by this 
censoring, then top code all years to reflect that portion for each source of income.  In this way, 
all sources of income are consistently top coded at the same point in the distribution in all years 
(See Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville, and Rovba, 2004 for a more detailed discussion of this 
process and a table showing the income sources, share of the population affected by the top code 
and the most constrained year).
4 
We develop an alternative federal income and social security tax estimation using the 
National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM Model that approximates the income and social 
security tax burdens available in the CPS for the years 1979 through 2000 and that can be used 
with consistently top-coded income variables in CPS to estimate these taxes. (A data appendix 
available from the authors provides greater details as does Rovba, 2006). 
4  Results 
4.1  Trends in Income and Income Inequality 
  Table 1 shows American, British, German, and Japanese mean and median after-tax 
income as well as the 90/10 ratio and Gini values for the peak years of their respective business 
cycles for the entire population and for older and younger persons. (Income and inequality values 
for all years are available from the authors upon request, as are before—pre-tax, post-transfer—
income values.)   
For the United States after-tax income (both mean and median) increased over both the 




by 10.93 percent over the 1980s (Column 4) and by 7.27 percent over the 1990s while median 
after-tax income increased by 5.95 percent and 7.10 percent respectively over these periods.  
Hence, average after-tax income increased substantially over both United States business cycles.  
But after-tax income growth was much more equally shared in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  
Income inequality rose substantially over the business cycle of the 1980s whether measured by 
the 90/10 ratio (23.67 percent) or by the Gini coefficient (14.17 percent).  In contrast, income 
inequality fell over the 1990s business cycle whether measured by the 90/10 ratio (-6.82 percent) 
or the Gini coefficient (-2.24 percent) (Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville and Rovba, 2004, using 
before-tax income, find similar trends).
5 
  Real after-tax income increased even more in Great Britain over the 1990s than in the 
United States measured by mean (20.61 percent) or median (20.84 percent) and after-tax income 
inequality fell measured by the 90/10 ratio (-6.78 percent) or the Gini coefficient (-3.59 percent).  
In contrast, while real after-tax mean (median) income in Germany increased by about the same 
amount as in the United States, 7.07 percent (5.62 percent), after-tax income inequality grew 
dramatically whether measured by a change in the 90/10 ratio (9.59 percent) or in the Gini 
coefficient (8.18 percent).  As a result, after-tax income inequality in Germany, which was 
substantially below after-tax income inequality in Great Britain at the beginning of the 1990s 
business cycle, was much closer to it at the end.  But the level of after-tax income inequality in 
both Great Britain and Germany still was considerably below the level of after-tax income 
inequality in the United States. In Japan, mean (median) real income increased over the 1990s by 
6.04 (5.73) percent, while the magnitudes of the percentage changes in income inequality were 




of income inequality in the United States than to those in Great Britain and Germany by the end 
of the period. 
  As Table 1 also shows, changes in after-tax income levels and within-group income 
inequality of older and younger persons also varied considerably across the four countries.  Mean 
(median) after-tax income of older persons in the United States grew dramatically over the 1980s 
business cycle both absolutely—19.95 (16.96) percent—and relative to younger persons—from 
83.3 to 90.7 (see last row of columns 1 and 2).  While real mean (median) after-tax income was 
higher at the end of the 1990 business cycle than at the start—it grew by 2.31 (5.45) percent—the 
mean after-tax income of older persons fell relative to younger persons—from 90.7 to 86.0 (see 
last row of columns 2 and 3). In Japan, over the business cycle of the 1990s, relative after-tax 
income of older persons fell from 94.1 to 89.8 percent. In contrast, the average real after-tax 
income of older persons in both Great Britain and Germany grew substantially over the 1990s 
business cycle and relative to their younger populations (last row of columns 6, 7, 9, and 10).   
  In all four countries, after-tax income inequality fell among older persons over the 1990s.  
The decline in income inequality was highest in Japan.  In the United States this decline, while 
modest, was in sharp contrast to the substantial increase in inequality over the 1980s.   
The growth in the average after-tax income of younger people over both United States 
business cycles was approximately the same.  Average after-tax income also increased at younger 
ages in Great Britain, Germany, and Japan in the 1990s with the greatest increase by far among 
younger Britains.   
The changes in after-tax income inequality among younger persons in the four countries 
were quite different over their 1990s business cycles.  Unlike the substantial increases in after-tax 
income inequality experienced among younger persons in the United States in the 1980s, after-
tax income inequality among younger persons in the United States fell as measured by both the  
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90/10 ratio (-7.61 percent) and Gini coefficient (-2.10 percent) in the 1990s.  In Great Britain, 
after-tax income inequality also fell substantially over the 1990s business cycle, while in 
Germany and Japan it rose substantially among younger persons, especially in Germany.  Hence, 
by the end of their 1990s business cycles, there was about the same level of after-tax inequality 
among younger Germans as was the case for younger Britains. 
Comparing after-tax income values and relevant measures of inequality in Table 1 to 
before-tax average incomes and corresponding 90/10 ratios and Gini coefficients in Appendix 
Table 1A, we observe the inequality reducing effect of taxation.  After-tax income inequality is 
lower than before-tax income inequality, whether measured by 90/10 ratio or Gini coefficient, for 
every sub-population and country in our analysis. Taxes also have a moderate equalizing effect 
on relative well-being of older populations. While the mean before-tax income of older to 
younger persons, for instance, in the United States in 2000 is 75.6 percent in Table 1A, the 
corresponding figure for after-tax income in Table 1 is 86.0 percent. Similar findings apply to our 
other three countries.  
4.2  Measuring Changes in the Income Distribution Using Kernel Density Estimation 
We now more fully explore how the distribution of after-tax income changed in each of 
these countries by estimating the probability density function of household size-adjusted after-tax 
income of their populations using Epanechnikov kernels with adaptive bandwidths.   Kernel 
estimators are well established in the statistics and econometrics literatures, see: Silverman 
(1986). For a technical discussion of the kernel density method employed here in the context of 
measuring economic well-being, see Burkhauser, Cutts, Daly and Jenkins (1999) and 
Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville and Rovba (2004).    
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  The first panel of Figure 1 shows that in 1979 the distribution of after-tax income in the 
United States had the traditional inverted U shape with the great mass of the population bunched 
around the mode of the distribution.  But by the end of the 1980s business cycle in 1989, the 
distribution had become much flatter.  The middle mass of the distribution around the mode fell 
(fewer people were in the middle of the distribution) with the vast majority spilling toward the 
higher tail of the distribution and a much smaller but still important group spilling toward the 
lower tail of the distribution. 
  However, between the two peak years of the 1990s business cycle, 1989 and 2000, the 
entire United States after-tax income distribution moved to the right.  More formally, the income 
distribution in 2000 attained first order stochastic dominance over the 1989 distribution.
6 At 
every percentile of the 2000 distribution, the level of income is higher in 2000 than in 1989, the 
previous business cycle peak year. While not everyone gained at the same rate, everyone in the 
distribution gained.  
  The second panel of Figure 1 shows the after-tax income distribution of older Americans.  
In 1979 the distribution has the traditional inverted U shape with an even greater mass of the 
population bunched near the mode.  As was the case for the more general population, by 1989 the 
middle mass fell with the vast majority becoming unequally richer.  Over the 1990s business 
cycle there was much less movement overall.  The smaller decline in the middle mass around the 
mode of the distribution spilled only somewhat to the right, creating a bulge in the distribution. 
  The third panel of Figure 1 shows the after-tax income distribution of younger Americans.  
In 1979, the distribution has the traditional inverted U shape and is closer in shape to the overall 




distributions.  Over the 1980s business cycle, the middle mass around the mode spilled primarily 
into the upper tail, but the entire distribution moved to the right over the 1990s business cycle. 
Figure 2 captures the change in the after-tax income distribution for Great Britain over 
their 1990s business cycle.  As Table 1 showed, Great Britain experienced substantial economic 
growth. The first panel of Figure 2 shows that the 2000 distribution attained first order stochastic 
dominance over the 1990 distribution.  Furthermore, the noticeable second hill in the 1990 
distribution is considerably smoother in the 2000 distribution. The older (panel 2) and younger 
(panel 3) populations also shifted to the right over the 1990s business cycle.  In all three 
populations, while the mode values declined, a far larger proportion of the distribution remained 
bunched near the middle of the distribution than was the case in the United States.  Nonetheless, 
the after-tax income distribution movements in Great Britain and the United States were very 
similar over their 1990s business cycles.  This stands in stark contrast to the movement in the 
after-tax income distribution in Germany and Japan over their 1990s business cycles. 
In 1991, the beginning year of the German business cycle, their after-tax income 
distribution (panel 1 of Figure 3) had the traditional inverted U shape with the great mass of the 
population near the mode of the distribution.  But unlike the United States or Great Britain, the 
after-tax income distribution in Germany at the end of their 1990s business cycle in 2001 did not 
attain first order stochastic dominance over the 1991 income distribution.  Rather, like the United 
States in the 1980s, the mass of the population near the mode of the distribution fell with the vast 
majority of people spilling rightward and becoming richer with a smaller but important share 
becoming poorer. 
  While panel 2 of Figure 3 shows that the after-tax income distribution of older Germans 
at the end of the 1990s business cycle, like that of older Britains, did attain first order stochastic 
dominance over the distribution at the beginning of the business cycle, panel 3 of Figure 3 shows  
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that the spillage of the middle mass away from the mode of the distribution of younger Germans 
over the 1990s business cycle more closely resembled the movement for younger Americans over 
their 1980s business cycle with a small but important group becoming poorer.  
The after-tax income distribution in Japan at the end of their 1990s business cycle in 2001 
also did not attain first order stochastic dominance over the after-tax income distribution at the 
beginning of the business cycle in 1989.  Panel 1 of Figure 4 shows that by the end of the 1990s 
business cycle, the overall distribution in Japan had become much flatter.  The middle mass of 
the distribution around the mode fell with the majority spilling toward the higher tail of the 
distribution and a very small group spilling toward the lower tail of the distribution.  
  While panel 2 of Figure 4 shows that the movement in the after-tax income distribution of 
older Japanese comes very close to achieving first order stochastic dominance over the 1990s 
business cycle, panel 3 of Figure 4 shows that the spillage of the middle mass away from the 
mode of the after-tax income distribution for younger Japanese closely resembled that of younger 
Americans over the 1980s business cycle and younger Germans over the 1990s business cycle. In 
all three cases, a small but important segment of the younger population became poorer.  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of the Significance of Distributions Shifts.  We use the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic to test whether the shifts in the distributions described above were 
statistically significant.  This test considers the null hypothesis that the distribution in one period 
is equal to the distribution in another period or H0: F1(x) = F2(x).  In practice, the cumulative 
distribution functions F1(x) and F2(x) may be calculated directly from the data or from the 
estimated kernel densities. We use the empirical cumulative distribution functions in our tests 
since they are easier to calculate and do not depend on our choice of kernel or bandwidth. 
Table 2 provides calculations of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for the pair-wise 
comparisons over the years covered by our study for the four countries. For the United States  
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population we compare the 1979 and 1989 distributions, the 1989 and 2000 distributions, and the 
1979 and 2000 distributions.  For Great Britain, we compare the 1990 and 2000 distributions. For 
Japan we compare 1989 and 2001 distributions and, for Germany, the 1991 and 2001 
distributions.  All tests indicate that the changes in the income distribution are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, we find statistically significant changes in the overall 
after-tax income distribution between peak-to-peak business cycle years in all four countries for 
the entire population, as well as for older and younger individuals. 
4.3  Tracking the Disappearing Middle of the After-Tax Income Distribution   
We use a test based on the binomial distribution to more precisely examine how the 
spillage out of the middle of the after-tax income distribution in the United States over the 1980s 
business cycle and in Germany and Japan over the 1990s business cycle was distributed between 
the two tails of the distribution.  To do so we first define the left and the right tails of the 
distribution. In the United States, for 1979 and 1989 after-tax income densities, we define the left 
intersection, and the left tail, as the point in the distribution at which the empirical after-tax 
income density in 1989 drops below the empirical after-tax income density in 1979. As can be 
seen in panel 1 of Figure 1, this intersection point is at $7,812 for the entire population. The right 
intersection point, which defines the start of the right tail, is the point in the distribution at which 
the after-tax income frequency density in 1989 rises above the after-tax income frequency density 
in 1979. This intersection point is at $31,693. The intersections for other pairs of densities are 
defined in a similar way.  (See panel 1 of Figures 2, 3, and 4.) 
Table 3 shows the proportion of the population contained in the left tail, middle and right 
tail as defined by the peak-to-peak year density function intersections for the United States  
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(columns 1 and 2) and Germany (columns 5 and 6) and Japan (columns 9 and 10) and their 
standard errors.
7 
In the United States, 7.18 percent (column 3) of the entire distribution slid out of the 
middle of the distribution over the 1980s business cycle.  But the vast majority of that 7.18 
percent (82.46 percent) became richer.  Over the German business cycle of the 1990s an even 
greater percentage of the middle mass around the mode of the distribution (8.23 percent) slid into 
the two tails.  But once again the vast majority (88.58 percent) became richer. In Japan, over the 
1990s business cycle, 6.18 percent of the middle mass moved to the tails, mostly to the right tail 
(93.20 percent). Nonetheless, in the United States (17.54 percent), in Germany (11.42 percent), 
and in Japan (6.80 percent) a small minority became poorer as after-tax income inequality rose in 
these countries. 
Table 3 shows that the movement out of the middle for young persons was even greater in 
the United States (7.87 percent), Germany (10.99 percent), and Japan (8.65 percent) than for the 
population as a whole. Furthermore, the share of the middle that dropped into the left tail was 
also greater in the United States (26.18 percent), Germany (22.47 percent), and Japan (14.22).  
Nonetheless, in all countries the overwhelming majority of the increase in inequality was caused 
by younger people becoming unequally richer. 
Significance Tests of Changes in the Tails of the Distribution. We test the statistical 
significance of the density changes in the tails of the after-tax income distribution reported in 
column 3 for the United States, column 7 for Germany, and column 11 for Japan using a 
binomial-based test statistic to determine whether the density masses contained in the left (or 
right) tails of two distributions differ. Specifically, letting p1 and p2 denote the probability that a 




respectively, we test whether these two proportions are the same using: 
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ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ , for each year i 
=1, 2. The  p Z statistic is asymptotically distributed standard normal. In all cases, we strongly 
reject the null hypothesis that the masses in the tails are the same for our paired years.   
5  Conclusion 
We find major differences in how after-tax income growth was distributed within our four 
countries over their 1990s business cycles. The real household size-adjusted after-tax income 
distributions of the United States and of Great Britain at the end of their 1990s business cycle 
achieved first order stochastic dominance over their after-tax income distributions at the 
beginning. Hence, unlike their experiences in the 1980s, all people in the United States and Great 
Britain shared the gains of economic growth in the 1990s. Moreover, in contrast to the 1980s, 
measured after-tax income inequality in the 1990s fell in both countries.   
In contrast, measured after-tax income inequality in Germany and Japan grew 
substantially over their 1990s business cycles.  Like the United States in the 1980s, the middle 
mass of the distribution fell around the mode. While the greatest share slid to the right, as people 
became unequally richer, a statistically significant but smaller share became poorer.  More 
remarkably, the relative movement out of the middle and into the two tails in Germany and Japan 
is very similar in magnitude to that of the United States over the 1980s. About 83 percent of the 
decline in the middle in the United States over the 1980s was accounted for by people becoming 
richer compared to about 89 percent in Germany and about 93 percent in Japan.  
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  In all four countries, average after-tax income of older persons grew in the 1990s but the 
growth in Great Britain and in Germany was greater both absolutely and relative to their younger 
populations. And in all four countries after-tax income inequality fell among their older 
populations over the period.  
While average after-tax income of younger persons also grew in all four countries over 
the 1990s, only in the United States were the gains greater among this population. It was in this 
subpopulation that the differences in how after-tax income growth was shared are greatest across 
the four countries. The after-tax income distributions among younger Americans and Britains at 
the end of the 1990s business cycle achieved first order stochastic dominance over their income 
distributions at the start. This was not the case for younger Germans or Japanese. In addition, 
after-tax income inequality fell among younger Americans and Britains but rose among younger 
Germans and Japanese. The middle mass of the after-tax income distribution of younger Germans 
and Japanese fell with the vast majority spilling to the right.  But a statistically significant but 
small share fell to the left. Once again the comparison with events in Germany and Japan in the 
1990s and the United States in the 1980s are remarkably similar. In the United States 74 percent 
of the decline is explained by younger Americans becoming richer compared to 78 percent in 
Germany and 86 percent in Japan. 
 This paper has focused on measuring what have been quite different changes in the after-
tax income distributions of four major OECD countries over their 1990s business cycles. The 
causes for these differences are not clear.  In the United States, the confluence of significant 
economic growth and work-based welfare reforms dramatically improved the employment and 
economic well-being of single women with children relative to the rest of the population and  
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more generally did so for lower-skilled workers.  This may in part explain why economic growth 
in the 1990s was more equally shared in the United States than it was in the 1980s.
8  
In Germany it may be that reunification, which occurred in 1989, not only dramatically 
changed the geography of reunited Germany but may have changed its political and economic 
makeup relative to that in its pre-unification western states. This paper captures income 
distribution changes over reunified Germany’s first business cycle. It remains to be seen if this 
was an inevitable short term outcome, given the significantly unequal market skills of the eastern 
and western states’ populations, which will quickly fade away.  Or, if it was the first round of a 
much longer term trend in a country where the greater inequality in market skills created with 
unification will continue to yield increases in income inequality for generations to come.  
Post-World War II Japan has long been characterized as a homogeneous society and one 
with a relatively low degree of income inequality (Vogel 1979, Tachibanaki, 2005).  But the rise 
in inequality over its 1990s business cycle suggests that by 2001, Japan could no longer be 
thought of as a "90 percent middle-class society" (Tachibanaki, 2005).  By 2001 the level of 
after-tax income inequality in Japan was closer to that of the United States than to Germany or 
Great Britain. The exact causes of this increase are not clear, but they may result from a complex 
interplay of demographic and economic factors, including population aging, greater heterogeneity 
in generational configurations within households, and most importantly the fuller emergence of a 
market-oriented economy, including a shift from a lifetime employment/seniority wage system to 
a more performance-based one. Finally, the steep rise in land and share prices during the “bubble 
economy” of the late 1980s and its subsequent fall over the 1990s may have increased 




In this paper we used kernel density estimation to look behind summary measures of 
after-tax income inequality to see how the entire distribution of after-tax income shifted over the 
1990s business cycle. We distinguished between increases in inequality caused by the middle of 
the distribution falling into the two tails, from increases in inequality caused by the population as 
a whole becoming unequally richer.  We did so because, other things equal, declines in after-tax 
income inequality are preferred to increases in after-tax income inequality. But increased 
inequality in a country where economic growth is making everyone richer is surely preferred to 
an outcome where the rich are getting richer at the expense of the rest of the population. 
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Appendix Table 1A. Before-Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income and Income Inequality, by Age in the United States, Great 
Britain, Germany and Japan. 
 







































All Persons          
Mean     28,697  31,708 34,334 10.49  8.28    14,160 16,818 18.77    23,015 25,178 9.40    3,738 3,897  4.26 
Median   25,195 26,597 28,500 5.56  7.15   12,602  15,008 19.09   20,894 22,366  7.05    3,262 3,398  4.17 
90/10   6.351  7.719 7.656 21.54  -0.82    5.027 4.574 -9.01    3.895 4.584 17.69    4.355 5.051  15.98 
Gini     0.352  0.387  0.387  9.94  0.00   0.316  0.304  -3.80   0.271  0.302  11.44    0.305 0.326  7.00 
        
Older Persons (aged 65 and older)        
Mean (A)    21,216 25,988 26,728  22.49  2.85   8,627  11,182 29.62   15,931 18,251  14.56    3,408 3,860  13.25 
Median   16,069 19,082 20,191  18.75  5.81   6,874  9,330  35.73   13,735 15,985  16.38    2,740 3,308  20.74 
90/10   6.081  6.708 6.586 10.31  -1.82    3.576 3.498 -2.18    3.470 3.240 -6.63    5.510 4.999  -9.27 
Gini   0.391  0.418  0.405  6.91  -3.11   0.292  0.282  -3.42   0.265  0.264  -0.38    0.352 0.328  -6.79 
        
Younger Persons (aged 64 and younger)        
Mean (B)    29,611 32,491 35,367 9.73  8.85   15,597  18,482 18.50   24,304 26,696  9.84    3,813 3,913  2.64 
Median   26,372 27,778 29,902 5.33  7.65   14,324  16,987 18.59   22,399 23,926  6.82    3,359 3,440  2.40 
90/10   6.141 7.759  7.67 26.35 -1.15   4.628  4.204  -9.16   3.640  4.590  26.10   4.025 5.093  26.54 
Gini   0.342  0.380 0.381 11.11  0.26    0.290 0.281 -3.10    0.258 0.295 14.34    0.293 0.325  11.01 
                            
Ratio (A)/(B)     0.717  0.800 0.756       0.553 0.605     0.656 0.684     1.201 1.009   
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-2001) in the United States, the Household Panel Survey (1991-2001) in Great Britain, and the Socio-
Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany. 
Notes:  
a Income values are in 2000 United States dollars 
b Income values are in 2000 British pounds 
c Income values are in 2000 euros 
  
  22
6  REFERENCES 
Artis, M.J., R.C. Bladen-Hovell and W. Zhang. 1995. “Turning points in the international 
business cycle: An analysis of the OECD leading indicators for the G7 countries,” OECD 
Economic Studies 24: 125 -165. 
Atkinson, A. B., L. Rainwater, T. M. Smeeding. 1995. Income Distribution in OECD Countries: 
Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study. (LIS).  Social Policy Studies No. 18, OECD 
Paris, October. 
Bach, S., G. Corneo and V. Steiner. 2007. From Bottom to Top: The Entire Distribution of 
Market Income in Germany, 1992-2001, IZA Discussion Paper Series DP. 2723, April. 
Biewen, M. 2000. “Income Inequality in Germany during the 1980s and 1990s,” The Review of 
Income and Wealth, 46 (1): 1-20. 
Burkhauser, R. V., J.S. Butler, S. Feng, and A.J. Houtenville.  2004. “Long Term Trends in 
Earnings Inequality:  What the CPS Can Tell Us.”  Economics Letters, 82 (2), 295-299. 
Burkhauser, R. V., B. A. Butrica, M. C. Daly, and D.R. Lillard. 2001. “The Cross-National 
Equivalent File: A Product of Cross-National Research.” In Irene Becker, Notburga Ott, and 
Gabriele Rolf (eds.) Soziale Sicherung In Einer Dynamischen Gesellschaft. Frankfurt, 
Germany: Campus Verlagi, pp. 354-376.  
Burkhauser, R.V., K.A. Couch, A.J. Houtenville, and L. Rovba.  2004. “Income Inequality in the 
1990s: Re-Forging a Lost Relationship?” Journal of Income Distribution, 12 (3-4), 8-35. 
Burkhauser, R.V., A.C. Cutts, M.C. Daly, and S.P. Jenkins.  1999. “Testing the Significance of 
Income Distribution Changes Over the 1980s Business Cycle:  A Cross-National 
Comparison.”  Journal of Applied Econometrics, 14, 253-272. 
Burkhauser R., S. Feng, and S. Jenkins. 2007.  Using the P90/P10 Index to Measure US 
Inequality Trends with Current Population Survey Data: A View from Inside the Census 
Bureau Vaults, IZA Discussion Paper Series DP. 2839, June. 
Burkhauser, R.V., T.M. Smeeding, and J. Merz. 1996. “Relative Inequality and Poverty in 
Germany and the United States Using Alternative Equivalency Scales,” The Review of 
Income and Wealth, 42(4): 381-400. 
Couch, K.A. and M.C. Daly. 2004. “The Improving Relative Status of Black Men,” Journal of 
Income Distribution, 12 (3-4): 56-78. 
DeNavas-Walt, C. and R. W. Cleveland. 2002. “Money Income in the United States: 2001,” 
Current Population Reports, US Census Bureau, September. 
Duncan, G., T. M. Smeeding, and W. Rodgers. 1994.”Whither the Middle Class?” in D. B. 
Papadimitriou and E. Wolff, eds., Poverty and Prosperity in the USA in the Late Twentieth 
Century (New York, Macmillian), pp. 202-271. 
Feng S., R. V. Burkhauser and J. S. Butler. 2006. “Levels and Long-Term Trends in Earnings 
Inequality: Overcoming Current Population Survey Censoring Problems Using the GB2 
Distribution,” Journal of Business and Economics Statistics 24 (1): 57-62.    
  23
Forster, M. and M. Pearson. 2002. Income Distribution and Poverty in the OECD Area: Trends 
and Driving Forces, Economic Studies Series No. 34, OECD, Paris.   
Fukawa, T. 2002. “Income Distribution and Retirement Income in Japan” The Japanese Journal 
of Social Security Policy, 1(1) (August): 27-36. 
Goodman, A and A. Shephard. 2002. Inequality and Living Standards in Great Britain Some 
Facts, IFS. Briefing Note 19. http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=1768 
Gottschalk, P. and T. M. Smeeding. 1997. “Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income 
Inequality,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35: 633-687. 
Karoly, L.A., and G. Burtless.  1995.  “Demographic Change, Rising Earnings Inequality, and the 
Distribution of Personal Well-Being, 1959-1989,” Demography, 32 (3): 379-405. 
Pen, J.. 1971. Income Distribution. New York: Praeger Publications. 
Piketty, T. and E. Saez. 2003. “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118: 1-39. 
Rovba, L. 2006. Three Essays on the Work and Economic Well-Being of People with Disabilities, 
PhD dissertation, Cornell University 
Saposnik, R. 1981. “Rank-Dominance in Income Distribution,” Public Choice, 36:147-151. 
Saposnik, R. 1983. "On Evaluating Income Distributions: Rank Dominance, the Suppes-Sen 
Grading Principle of Justice and Pareto Optimality,” Public Choice, 40: 329-36. 
Silverman, B.W. 1986. Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. London: Chapman 
and Hall. 
Smeeding T.M. 1997. US Income Inequality in a Cross National Perspective: Why Are We So 
Different? Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper No.157.  
Tachibanaki, T. 1996. Wage Determination and Distribution in Japan, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Tachibanaki, T. 2005. Confronting Income Inequality in Japan: A Comprehensive Analysis of 
Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Terasaki, Y. 2002. “The Impact of Changes in Family Structure on Income Distribution in Japan, 
1989-1997 Rising Inequality of Household Income Reconsidered,” The Japanese Journal of 
Social Security Policy, 1(1): S2-S16. 




Table 1. After-Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income and Income Inequality, by Age in the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, and Japan. 







































All Persons          
Mean      22,494  24,954 26,767 10.93  7.27    11,539 13,917 20.61    17,377 18,605 7.07    3,205 3,399 6.04 
Median    20,892  22,135 23,707 5.95  7.10    10,583 12,788 20.84    16,146 17,054 5.62    2,829 2,991 5.73 
90/10    4.71  5.82 5.42 23.67 -6.82   3.89 3.63 -6.78   3.10 3.39 9.59    4.24   4.65   9.64 
Gini      0.301  0.344 0.336 14.17  -2.24      0.274 0.264 -3.59      0.231 0.250 8.18      0.298   0.315 5.84 
        
Older Persons (aged 65 and older)        
Mean  (A)    19,078  22,884 23,413 19.95  2.31    8,146  10,683 31.16    14,289 16,259 13.79    3,048  3,150 3.35 
Median    15,805  18,486 19,493 16.96  5.45    6,819  9,279  36.07    12,908 14,740 14.19    2,486  2,679 7.76 
90/10    5.21  5.61 5.41 7.72  -3.60   3.30 3.25 -1.70   3.15 3.01 -4.38   5.36  4.73  -11.75 
Gini    0.344  0.373 0.351 7.14  -4.03    0.262 0.258 -1.57    0.241 0.239 -1.15    0.342  0.327  -4.46 
        
Younger Persons (aged 64 and younger)        
Mean  (B)    22,911  25,237 27,222 10.15  7.87    12,413 14,862 19.73    17,937 19,113 6.56    3,241  3,507 8.20 
Median    21,472  22,643 24,335 5.46  7.47    11,522 13,897 20.61    16,758 17,663 5.40    2,900  3,137 8.17 
90/10    4.55  5.81 5.37 27.72 -7.61   3.67 3.46 -5.73   2.97 3.43 15.45   4.00  4.38  9.54 
Gini    0.290  0.340 0.332 15.52  -2.10    0.257 0.251 -2.46    0.225 0.249 10.89    0.287  0.308  7.41 
                               
Ratio (A)/(B)     83.3  90.7  86.0           65.6  71.9        79.7  85.1        94.1  89.8    
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-2001) in the United States, the Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2001) in Great Britain, the Socio-Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany, and the Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution (1990 and 2002). 
Notes:  
a Income values are in 2000 United States dollars 
b Income values are in 2000 British pounds 
c Income values are in 2000 euros 
d Income values are in 2000 yens   
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Table 2.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Differences in Income Distributions Across Paired Years. 
 

















  1990 
versus 
2000 






Total  Population  5.85 3.90 5.95    7.98    21.73   8.65 
Aged 64 and younger  4.75  2.85  4.68     3.63    22.69   6.95 
Aged 65 and older  2.30  2.50  3.58    15.40      8.79    4.85 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-2001) in the United States, the Household 
Panel Survey (1991-2001) in Great Britain, the Socio-Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany, and the Japanese Survey of Income 
Redistribution (1990 and 2002). 
Note: All test statistics are significant at 1 percent level.   
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Table 3. Change in the Distribution of the Population Mass over Paired Years in the United States, Germany, and Japan. 
 























a  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
All Persons   
Less than left 
intersection  5.24 6.50 -1.26  -17.54  4.69 5.63 -0.94  -11.42  7.18 7.60 -0.42  -6.80 
  (0.053) (0.062) (0.082)    (0.109) (0.092) (0.142)    (0.068) (0.069) (0.094)   
Middle of 
distribution  77.86 70.68 7.18  100.00  74.17 65.94 8.23  100.00  69.37 63.19 6.18  100.00 
  (0.099) (0.114) (0.151)    (0.243) (0.201) (0.316)    (0.112) (0.150) (0.186)   
Greater than right 
intersection  16.90 22.82 -5.92  -82.46  21.14 28.43 -7.29  -88.58  23.45 29.21 -5.76  -93.20 
   (0.089) (0.106) (0.138)    (0.231) (0.193) (0.301)    (0.096) (0.125) (0.142)   
   
Younger Persons (aged 64 and younger) 
Less than left 
intersection  14.13 16.19 -2.06  -26.18  9.96  12.43 -2.47  -22.47  10.12 11.35 -1.23  -14.22 
  (0.084) (0.095) (0.127)    (0.163) (0.142) (0.216)    (0.073) (0.096) (0.123)   
Middle of 
distribution  69.30 61.43 7.87  100.00  64.89 53.90 10.99  100.00  62.90 54.25 8.65  100.00 
  (0.115) (0.130) (0.174)    (0.273) (0.226) (0.354)    (0.140) (0.158) (0.170)   
Greater than right 
intersection  16.57 22.38 -5.81  -73.82  25.15 33.67 -8.52  -77.53  26.98 34.40 -7.42  -85.78 
   (0.095) (0.113) (0.148)    (0.252) (0.216) (0.332)    (0.102) (0.112) (0.156)   
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (1980-2001) in the United States and the Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2001) in Great Britain, the Socio-Economic Panel (1992-2002) in Germany, and the Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution (1990 and 2002). 
Note:  
a  See Figures 1, 3, 7, and 9 for the exact income values at the point of intersection of each density pair.
b Standard errors are in parentheses.  All distribution 
changes are significant at 1 percent level according to tests based on  p Z  statistic. 
c Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of After-Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income in United States in Peak Business Cycle Years 
 













































































































After Tax Household Sized-Adjusted Income, 2000 Dollars 
   
                                   Panel 1                                                               Panel 2                                                              Panel 3 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the March CPS Annual Demographic Files, 1980, 1990, and 2001.  
$ 7,812  $ 31,693 
$ 10,086 $ 36,417 
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Figure 2. Distribution of After-Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income in Great Britain in Peak Business Cycle Years 
 






































































































 After-Tax Household Sized-Adjusted Income, 2000 Pounds 
 
                            Panel 1                                                                       Panel 2                                                      Panel 3 
  
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the British Household Panel Survey, 1991 and 2001. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of After-Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income in Germany in Peak Business Cycle Years 
 




































































































After-Tax Household Sized-Adjusted Income, 2000 Euros 
 
                                        Panel 1                                                           Panel 2                                                            Panel 3 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992 and 2002. 
€ 7,119  € 22,250 



































































































Figure 4. Distribution of After-Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income in Japan in Peak Business Cycle Years 
 























                                                                                                                                                                               
  
                                                                                                                                                            
 
After-Tax Household Size-Adjusted Income, 2000‘000 yen 
                    Panel 1                                                             Panel 2                                                                       Panel 3 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from the Japanese Survey of Income Redistribution, 1990 and 2002. 





1.  The starting and ending years of a business cycle are somewhat arbitrary.  Rather then define 
them directly by changes in macroeconomic growth, we use peaks in income which will, in 
general, lag macroeconomic growth.  This rule is straightforward in the United States and 
Great Britain where there are distinguishable peak years in average income.  For Germany, 
income years 1991 and 1992 are similar.  We chose 1991, though its average income was 
slightly lower than 1992, since it was closer to the peak year as defined using standard 
macroeconomic growth data.  In Japan, differences in average income were much less 
pronounced.  We chose 1989 and 2001 because they roughly correspond to peak years based 
on OECD methodology using a composite index of wage and salary income, employment, 
the industrial production index, manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly gross domestic 
product.  (See:  Artis, Bladen-Hovell and Zhang, 1995).  Our findings are not sensitive to 
reasonable changes to the peak years we choose to compare.  While we have calculated 
average after-tax income and income inequality for all years in our study, here we focus on 
similar years in the business cycle. 
2. Over time the CPS has improved its ability to capture the top part of the income distribution 
but even the restricted access CPS is subject to censoring at the top and can’t capture the top 1 
percent or so of the income distribution. (See: Feng, Burkhauser and Butler, 2006; 
Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins, 2007.) Hence the CPS can not capture changes at the very top 
of the distribution that may impact on both the level and trend in income inequality. Piketty 
and Saez (2003) using United States federal income tax data argue that increases in the very 
top of the income distribution have significantly increased income inequality in the United 




GSOEP does not capture the very top of the German income distribution. Using German 
income tax data together with GSOEP data they find levels and trends in German income 
inequality over the period 1992-2001 are greater than those found using the GSOEP data 
alone. 
 3. The formula used in this calculation is: Ya = Yu / F
θ, where Ya is the household size-adjusted 
income available to each household member, Yu is total unadjusted household income, F is 
household size and θ is the household size scale elasticity.  We assume θ = 0.5.  As discussed 
in Karoly and Burtless (1995, p. 382), this implies returns to scale such that a four person 
household requires only twice as much total unadjusted household income as a one person 
household for each of its members to attain the same level of economic well being as the 
person in the one person household. 
  4. Our consistently top coded income measure produces Gini coefficients that are significantly 
lower than those for the full sample since we are systematically cutting off the upper tail of 
the distribution of income in all years, but as Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville, and Rovba 
(2004) show, there is no significant difference in the trends between the Gini coefficients 
produced by the Census Bureau based on their internal CPS data and our Gini coefficients 
both before the major change in their top coding rules in 1992 and afterward.  (See:  
DeNavas-Walt and Cleveland 2002, p.20-22, Table A-3, for internal Census Gini values.)  
Hence we believe our income inequality trends provide an accurate measure of income 





5.  Researching using LIS equivalized CPS data to capture trends in income inequality in the 
United States will find that the LIS methods of trimming the data yield trends in after-tax 
income inequality using Gini values in the 1990s that are closer to those found in the 
uncorrected CPS public use data.  (LIS website: 
//www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm)  That is, their Gini values are implausibly high 
after 1994 because they do not correct for major changes in top coding and other issues of 
censoring. (Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville, and Rovba, 2004)   
6.  First order stochastic dominance is formally defined as follows:  Consider two income 
distributions y1 and y2 with cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) F(y1) and F(y2).  If F(y1) 
lies nowhere above and at least somewhere below F(y2) then distribution y1 displays first 
order stochastic dominance over distribution y2:  F(y1) < F(y2) for all y. Alternatively, this can 
be expressed by using the inverse function y=F
-1(p) where p is the share of the population 
with income less than a given income level.  First order dominance is attained if F1
-1(p) > F2
-
1(p) for all p.  The inverse function F
-1(p) is known as a Pen’s Parade (Pen, 1971), which plots 
income against cumulative population, usually using ranked income qualities.  The dominant 
distribution is one whose Parade lies nowhere below and at least somewhere above the other.  
First order stochastic dominance of distribution y1 over y2 implies that any social welfare 
function that is increasing in income, will record higher levels of welfare in distribution y1 
than in distribution y2 (Saposnik, 1981, 1983).                                  
7.  We can estimate the proportion of interest  p ˆ from the kernel density estimates or directly 
from the data.  We have used the latter method in order to avoid complicated reliance on the 





















1 ˆ 1 ˆ , where  p ˆ is the estimated proportion of interest. 
8.  See Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville and Rovba (2004) and Couch and Daly (2004) for a 
more detailed discussion.  Trends in Great Britain appear to be similar to those in the United 
States (see Goodman and Shephard, 2002 for a detailed discussion). 